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CAPITAL MARKET IMPERFECTIONS BEFORE AND AFTER
FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION: A  Euler Equation Approach to
Panel Data for Ecuadorian Firms
I.- INTRODUCTION
During the 80's Ecuador introduced  financial reforms to facilitate capital
accumulation and  growth.  These  reforms  consisted mainly  of  the  removal  of
administrative  controls on the interest rate, and the elimination or  scaling down of
directed credit programs. Whereas there has been a growing literature and research
effort in assessing  the effect of liberalization  on the financia! markets, less is known
about the effects of these reforms on firms.  The studies that exist are often descriptive
in nature and have concentrated  on the larger macro picture. The purpose of this paper
is to provide some evidence on the effects of liberalization  by focusing on individual
firms as the unit of analysis. The question we address here is whether financial  reform
has relaxed the constraints faced by firms in obtaining external funds for investment.
Our empirical investigation  is based on a rich panel data set for Ecuador, containing
balance sheets and profit and losses statements  for 420 manufacturing  companies over
the period 1983-1988.
In  order  to  evaluate the  effects of  financial reform  on  firms'  capital
accumulation  decision, we must improve our understanding  of the relationship  between
firms'  financial and  real  choices, in  the  presence of  imperfections in  the capital
markets. Such imperfections are due to  the existence of administrative  controls and
regulations, and, at a deeper lev_l, to asymmetric  information  problems.  A growing
body  of  literature has  examined how informational asymmetries and  the  risk  of
bankruptcy may restrict access to outside funding and the implications thereof for a
firm's investment  decisions,  even in the absence  of administrative  credit rationing.'
The empirical work in this field has mainly  tried to assess whether there is a
significant departure from investment mnodels  derived in the absence of  information
asymmetries and incentives problems, and whether the importance of such departure
varies across firms with different characteristics.  Most of the empirical work has used
data from developed couniries, for which panel data on firms were available, and it
I  At a theoretical  level see the contributions  by Stiglitz  and Weiss (1981, 1987), Wette (1984), Myers
and Majluf (1984), Bemanke  and Gertler (1989), Gertler and Hubbard (1988), Greenwald and Stiglitz
(1988).4
provides evidence against the perfect capital paradigm. 2 Frequently the econometric
strategy consists of adding financial variables, in particular cash flow and debt, to a
standard investment  model, usually  based on a neoclassical  technology  with adjustment
costs, yielding a relationship between investment and the market value of the firm
relative to  the replacement cost of  capital (Tobin's Q).  Under the assumption of
perfect capital markets, financial variables should not matter, given Q. Its significance
is taken as a sign of imperfections  in the capital  markets.
Another  set of contributions  starts from a model with adjustment  costs, like
the first group of  papers, and directly estimates the Euler equation for investment,
without making use of Q.  The idea here is that the standard Euler equation will be
mispecified  for those firms that either have reached the (exogenous)  maximum  amount
of debt allowed, or are at the point of paying no dividends. A correctly specified  Euler
equation would contain multipliers associated  with the constraints, and their omission
would lead to mispecification. 3
The  Euler  equation approach is  particularly appealing for  developing
countries (where stock markets are not well developed) because it does not require
information on stock market values.  In this section we extend the Euler equation in
two directions.  First we assume that agency problems can be thought  of as giving rise
to an increasing cost of  borrowing above the  safe rate,  as  the degree of leverage
increases (see also  Galeotti et  al.  (1989)). Second we  introduce ceilings on  the
maximum  degree of leverage that various firms are allowed, and discuss whether this
form of imperfection  can be distinguished  from the rising cost of funds schedule. We
then ask empirically whether these two forms of imperfection  affect firms differently,
and whether they become  less severe after financial  liberalization.
The lack of appropriate firms'  panel data for LDC's  has hindered the
econometric investigation of  the  relationship between  investment and  financial
conditions. With a few exceptions, the work on investment  has been conducted  u.sing
aggregate data that are inappropriate for determining the role of  financial factors in
capital accumulation  decisions  and how their relevance  varies across  different groups of
firms and over time, particularly with regard to the effects of financial  liberalization. 4
2 Examples  are Fazzari, Hubbard  and Petersen  (1988), Gertler and Hubbard  (1988), Hoshi et al. (1988),
Blundell,  Bond,  Devereux,  and Schiantarelli  (1992), and Devereux  and Schiantarelli  (1990).
3  See Gilchrist (1989), Whited (1992), Hubbard and  Kashyap (1992), Galeotti, Schiantarelli  and
Jaramillo  (1990), Gertler, Hubbard, and Kashyap  (1990).
4  Tybout (1983) uses three  digits manufacturing industry data for  Colombia.  He  partitions his5
The availability of panel data for Ecuador allows us to investigate whether financial
liberalization has relaxed financial constraints and whether it  has helped financing
investment.  s
The  structure of  the paper is as  follows. In  Section II,  we develop a
theoretical model for investment  that allows for a rising premium for external finance
and for a  ceiling in she debt to capital ratio, and we derive the appropriate Euler
equation for the capital stock. In Section III, we present econometric evidence on the
importance of  capital market imperfections for different categories of  firms (small
versus large, young versus old). In Section IV, we test wh..ier  financial reform has
relaxed financial  constraints. In addition  of the evidence based on Euler equations, we
also present results for a  more ad hoc investment model. Section V concludes the
paper.
II.- THE MODEL
Denote by Rt the required rate of return, the following standard arbitrage
condition must hold for a firm's shareholder:
(1)  _  (-  m,) D, + (I -z,) Et (W,+ 1 - W,-  S)
where Dt denotes dividends, Wt  the value of the firm, St  the nominal value of new
shares, mt the personal tax rate, zt the tax rate on capital gains, and Et the conditional
expectations  operator. 6 Solving  (1) recursively  gives us the present discounted value of
observations  into small and large firm-, and investigates  whether the significance  of profits in a standard
accelerator model varies according to firms' size. Another example is Nabi (1989) for Pakistan. Most
studies for developing  countries include  various measures  of the aggregate  credit as independent  variables
in (quasi) reduced  form investment  equations. Aggregate  data for various LDC's is used for estimation.
See Fry (1988) for a review.
5 See  Jaramillo, Schiantarelli,  and Weiss (1992) for an empirical  analysis on a different  but related topic,
namely  whether financial  liberalization  has succeeded  in allocating  credit and investment  to more  efficient
firns.
6 For developing  countries, in which often equity markets  are absent, equation  (1) should be interpreted
broadly. Dividends should be understood also as profits distributed to the owners, which may take
various forms, , including  direct salaries  or other perks provided to manager-owners.  New share issues
should be seen as fresh money from the owner or other investors that is remunerated  by dividend
payments  or capital gains.6
the  company. We  assume that firms maximize the value of  the  firm for existing
shareholders,  Wt:
00
(2)  Wt =  Et jY.  [t  +j  Dt+j  -t+j
subject to the following  constraints:
(3)  Dt =  (1- Tt) [Pt F(Kt, Nt, It) - wt Nt - itBt I - A (Bt 1, pk  Kti1)]
+  (Bt - Bt-1)  - k It  +  St  +  Ct Pt It +  +
4)  Kt  (I  -6)Kt-I  + It
Dt  20
Bt  Ž0
S  n  >0
t
where:





Tt= corporate tax rate
Pt =  output price
F(.)  = net production  function
Kt = capital stock
Nt =  labor
It  =  investment
Wt =  wage  rate
it  =  riskless interest rate
Bt = stock of debt
Pt  K =  price of investment goods
Ct=  tax savings associated  with depreciation  allowances  on existing capital  goods
We are allowing for internal costs for adjusting  the capital stock, so that the
production function F(Kt, Nt, It) can depend  negatively  upon investment  (F 1 <  0). The
adjustment  costs are convex (F 11 <  0) and the firm faces a downward  sloping demand7
function  for  its  product.  Finally  we  explicitly  include  in  the  maximand an
agency/financial  distress cost function A(.) which captures the premium paid by firms
above the safe rate, i. The premium on external borrowing reflects the asymmetry  of
information be-tween  the borrower and the  lender and  the difficulty of  enforcing
contracts. In those cir^ mstances  there is a potential  conflict between the interest of the
two parties which results in the lender imposing  on the borrower a cost over and above
the safe rate. This cost may take the form of an explicitly  higher rate of interest, or of a
set  of  restrictions limiting borrowers'  discretionary actions.  Since the  greater the
amount of debt in firm's  financial structure, the more severe the incentive problem
becomes, we assume that agency  costs increase  with the stock of debt (AB >  0) 7. We
also  assume  that  agency  costs  are  a  decreasing  function  of  the  amount  of
collateralizable  assets, represented  here by the capital stock (AK < 0).
Besides  this premium on debt, we allow for another type of capital market
imperfection, namely that there is an upper limit to the debt to capital ratio that lenders
consider acceptable. One additional  constraint  will therefore  appear in the maximization
problem:
(5)  M-  k  2  0
Pt  Kt
where M  is some exogenous ceiling on the maximum debt to capital ratio that is
specific to the firm.
Another type of capital market imperfection  that can be easily incorporated
in  the  maximiz-;ion problem is  the  existence of  a  premium on  new equity. The
premium can be generated  by an adverse selection  argument,  whereby  only firms which
are  overvalued have an incentive to  issue new shares (Myers and Majluf (1984)).
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) suggest to replace Sn  by (1  +ot)  S+  where
eot captures the existence of a  lemon premium.  ot could also be interpreted as the
transaction costs that firms must beat when issuing new shares. In this paper, we will
focus on the agency cost of debt. The first order conditions for Kt, It, Nt, Bt, and St
are respectively:
7 We will also assume that agency  costs  are convex in debt, so that ABB > 08
(6)  (Yt  + Xt) (1-,t) [Pt (1  s 1)  Fkt]-  Et (Yt+I + 7,d  (i-,t+1)  t+  I  Akt
k +  B2  +  Et  (1-) 
~ t
(7)  (Yt + x  d) [(I-t)  Pt (I - et ) Fit -(1-t)  Pk] +  Xk  =  0
(8)  (Yt +  )  (1  -t)  [Pt (1  e-)  Fnt -wt]  =  0
t [P  t~~~t  (9)  (Yt +  x  d) - E-t  Pt  1 (Yt  1  t  )(  1t+  1) it+  1)
m
- Et  +  (Yt+  I  Xt+i)(l  r-t+1)  c  _  t  +  t
d  s~~~~~ 
(10)  (lt  +  C)-  d  + Xts  =  0
where 1Lt  is the present value of tax savings  associated  with depreciation  allowances  on
k  d  bs  m investment, and At,  Xt' and Xt  are the Lagrange multipliers associated  with
the capital accumulation equation, with the non-negativity constraints on  dividends,
debt, new share issues, and with the ceiling on the debt to capital ratio. Subscripts k
and i  indicate first derivatives respect to capital and investment. E is  the demand
elasticity and recognizes  explicitly the possibility of imperfect competition. Equations
(6) through (10), in addition to the complementary  slackness condition (not reported
here for brevity sake) defines  the firm's optimal  plan.
It is well known  that in this model  a firm will not issue new shares  and pay
dividends  simultaneously. 8 When the firm issues debt but no new shares, and dividends
8  This can be seen from equation  (10) and the complementary  slackness  conditions. When new shares  are
s  d issued,  .O*  (10) then implies that  St  >0,  and hence Dt=O (provided  that l>yt).  When dividends
d  s
are paid, \  =0. Then (10) implies  that At  >0.  It is also possible to consider a regime  in which a firm is
not paying dividends  or issuing shares. See section  11.2  for further  discussion.9
are strictly positive in period t and t+ 1, then  d  =%  +1=0.  Then solving for  k  into
(7), substituting  in (6) and assuming  a constant demand  elasticity, we obtain:
(1E1)  Fkt + Fit-  Et wt  +  {IPt  (1-8)  FitI+  =
|Pt  E  tttlt+  tt+l  +  Et  t+
l (-Vt  Pt  t  t1p  (1  -,t+ 1) Pt+ I  Pt Yt  0-,ct)
xm  Bt
Yt  (l-Tt) Pt P  Kt 2
where:
-t-iYt  (l-Ot  I)  Pt4-1
t+ 1  Tt (l-Ct) Pt
This is the appropriate  Euler equation when the firm finances its investment
at the margin through retentions and new debt. Note that equation (11) contains on the
right-hand  side the unobservable  multiplier  m assQciated  with the ceiling in the debt to t
capital ratio. The left hand side of equation (11) is the marginal product of capital net
of adjustment  costs. The first term on the right hand side is the standard user cost of
capital, the second term the marginal reduction  in agency cost generated by an increase
in the capital stock, and the last term captures the value of an additional unit of capital,
insofar as it relaxes the ceiling on the degree of leverage. Along the optimal path, the
net marginal product  of capital must equal marginal  net financial  costs.
We could obtain an Euler equation for capital that does not contain the
unobservable non negativity multiplier for dividends also when the firm's  marginal
source of finance is new equity, while dividend payments are equal to zero, since in
this case (10) implies that k d=i-yt.  However, it is possible to think of a situation in
which a  firm with good investment opportunities has used up all  its retentions by
cutting dividends to zero, yet it is not profitable to issue new shares. At the margin,10
investment  will be financed  only through  debt. 9 If this is the case at time t or at t+ 1,
X  d and X  d  will be different from zero in (6) through (10). Since k s and  tsI  will t  t+1  t  *t+1
also be non-zero, the unobservable  non-negativity  multiplier for dividends cannot be
eliminated from the Euler equation. As a  result (14) and (16) will be misrecified
because they have been obtained by assuming positive dividends payments, so that kd
d~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
=d  1  °  The emphasis on the dividend floor characterizes the contributions of
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) in the context of  Q models, and by  Whited
(1988) and Gilchrist (1989) in the context of the Euler equation approach.  Although
the dividend floor constraint may be empirically important, in this paper we assume
that dividend  payments  are positive, and we concentrate  on the imperfection  related to
the cost and availability of debt, which are of great importance in the context of a
developing country. This choice is also motivated by  the fact that our data set on
Ecuadorian firms does not contain direct information  on  dividend  payments. Hubbard
and Kashyap (1992), Gertler, Hubbard and Kashyap (1990) also focus on debt, and
consider the consequences for the specification  of Euler equations of  an exogenous
upper limit on the amount of loans available to a  firm. Devereux and Schiantarelli
(1990), in  the context of  Q  models, and  Bond and  Megir  (1990), and Galeotti,
Schiantarelli,  and Jaramillo (1990), in the context of Euler equations, allow instead for
a rising cost of borrowing.  In this paper we allow for both a premium on external
finance, that increases with the debt to capital ratio, and for a ceiling in the degree of
leverage.
II.1.- EULER EQUATION WITH NON-BINDING  CONSTRAINTS
Consider the case in which the firm pays dividends, issues debt, but the
ceiling on the degree of leverage is not binding. In this situation, since  m =0,  no t
unobservable  multiplier will appear in equation  (11). If we assume that the agency cost
function is homogeneous  of degree one in debt and the capital stock, equation (9) with
d  m  b x  = X  =X  = 0,  will de;_,.rmine  the optimal debt to capital ratio for each level of the
t  t  t
discount factor,  t  1  For the purpose of econometric  estimation  of equation (11) it is
9 The floor on dividend payments may be above zero for signaling reasons.  Nothing of substance changes
in our analysis .f dividend floor is strictly positive.11
necessary  to paramettize  the agency  cost ftinction. Assume  that:
k  cB2
(12)  A(Bt-l, p  tKt-i)  =  k  t
t-I  2 p  Ktl 
This sDecification  implies that we can think of the interest rate on debt
issued at the end of period t-I to be equal to the safe rate it, plus a premium that is
linear in the degree of leverage,  c  t-K  . In order to obtain an equation that can 2 pt1l  Kt-I
be  estimated,  we  assume an  additively separable production function such  that
F(Kt,Nt,It)  F(Kt,No) - G(Kt,ID, where F(.)  is a  gross value added production
function and G(.) is a convex adjustment  cost function. We assume that both functions
are  homogeneous of  degree one  in  their arguments, and  that the adjustment cost
function  can be written as:
(13)  G(Kt,  Xt  b  t
2  Kt
We would expect (although we will not impose) a positive value for b.
Using (12) and (13), and replacing  expected by actual values we obtain the following
equation:
(14)  (Kt  t+  +  2tO  I  IL
K  tJ
t
al  {  (l-lt)  Pt  -t+  +  (-)(1-Pt+1PPt+ 1 pkK  pt  +c2J} t  t+1~~~~~~P  I
F Yt+l(l-t+  1)t+1  Bt  Pt  t+ I±
+  a3  5  ~~~k  2  r+V+
+a3 j yt(l-tt)  (P  t) 2  Pt  J
where:12
al  =  ;a2  a3  =  ce b(e-l)'  b(e-1)'  2b(e-l1)
7et  represents nominal operating profits (value added minus wage bill), Yt
output, and vt+ 1 is a serially uncorrelated  forecast error.'I Note that equation (14) is
exactly identified so we can recover the structural parameters of the model. We are
particularly interested  in the slope  of the agency  cost function, c. Note also that if there
is perfect competition,  i.e. e -oo,  then alI = 1/b,  a2 =0, and  a3=  -c/2b .
II.2.- EULER  EQUATION  WITH  BINDING  CONSTRAINTS
Equation (14) is correctly specified only if the firm does not face credit
constraints. When the ceiling for the debt to capital ratio is reached, an additional
variable containing  the unobservable  multiplier Xm  should appear in the Euler equation t
(see equation (11)). However, even if the ceiling is binding, we can eliminate  e
using the first order condition for debt. If we continue to assume that the firm pays
d  d  b dividends, and it is using a positive amount of debt, so that  t  = X  =  =0,  from
(9) we can obtain:
m




Substituting  (15) into (11) an replacing  expected  by actual values yields:
(16)  IVt+  I+  16  +  I  t2  -iL
Kt 9
10  Note t6at F(K,N) =  Fk K +  Fn N. Using the first order condition for labor, equation (8), we can
obtain Fk =  - I  Together  with (12) and (13), this yields equation  (14). s-i  K 1-13
t  (0-  t+l)Pt+ilrt  Pt  1  +  1  J
b(  -I)  (1 -'CO  Pt  t+1  t+1(  (1-Jt+ I) Pt+ I  pk Kt  Pt  be1)t
CE  k  Yt+t (l-t+  1)  t  +  Bt  Pt
k  2  RE+  - k  2
( )  t  'yt(l--CO (Pi  Kt) 2Pt  J  (-l  Yt(l-T)  (pi  Kt)  PtJ
E  [Yt  - 0  0  Yt+1 (1 + (l-Tt+l)  it+1 )]  Bt  P  k
k  ?~+  vt+  I Pt
b(e-1)  Yt(1-tt)  pt  Kt Pt  T
Comparing (14) with (16), we see that two additional regressors (the last
two in (16)) now appear in the Euler equation. They are a quadratic  and a linear term
in the debt to capital ratio. Adding together the coefficients  of the two quadratic  terms
in the debt to capital ratio reverses the sign that we have obtained  in the case in which
credit constraints were not binding. This is a convenient  feature of the model  because it
allows us to test whether the ceiling on debt is binding or not. Therefore, the equation
to be estimated  can be written as:
17)  (It+1It+i  +  I  K  IL
-t)  +I  at+  1t+  K1()(-t+1  t+ 1  2  K  p  +a2{Kt  kkk f  -(-  Yt  (--At+)  I  Pt+  I  Btt  P  t
a 4 l  k  2  ? +
V  Tt(l-Tt)  (Pt KDt  Pt  J14
([Yt - t0  y  t+ I (I  + (1-,rt+ 1) it+  1 )]  Bt  p k 
cz4{(Yt  Yt  (1-tt)  Pk Kt pt}
where:
oc,  .o2=  a3  C,;a4 
b(s-1);  b(s 1)'  2b(- 1)'  b(s-1)
The importance  and the type of capital market imperfections  is reflected in
the significance  and signs of the coefficients  in front of the leverage terms in equation
(17). If a3 >0  and a4 <0,  then this can be taken as evidence that the firm faces an
increasing premium for external finance, and that it has also hit the ceiling constraint
for leverage. Note also that the model  implies that -o4 = al  = E/[b(e-1)]. If we impose
this restriction, the model becomes  just identified and we can recover the structural
parameters. If a3 <0  and a4 is not different than zero, then we return to the model  of
equation (14), in which the interest rate increases  with the debt to capital ratio, but the
ceiling is not binding. Finally, if a3 =0  and c4=0,  then we are back to a  model in
which both types of financial  constraints  are absent.
111-  CAPITAL  MARKET  IMPERFECTIONS  AND FIRMS'  HETEROGENEITY:
ECONOMETRIC  RES ULTS
In the specification  and estimation of the various models, the error term is
modeled  as the sum of a firm specific  effect, a time effect common  to all firms, and an
a  idiosyncratic shock.  To eliminate the  firm specific effect all  the equations are
estimated in first differences. To allow for the potential  endogeneity  of the regressors,
we use the Generalized Method of Moments (See Hansen (1982), and Arellano and
Bond (1991)). As a test of specification  we also provide the Sargan-Hansen  test of
over-identifying  restrictions. l 
The model summarized  in equation (17) has been estimated  on a balanced
panel of 420 firms in the manufacturing  sector, covering the period 1983-1988.  The
panel is based on data collected by the Superintendencia  de Compahiias,  and consist of
balance sheets and profit and loss statements.' 2 In order to estimate (17), we must
I  I We have used the DPD program  for estimation.  See Arellano and Bond (1988).
12  See the Data Appendix for a more detailed description.15
choose a proxy for the discount factor  3 0 0  i3  We have experimented  with proxies t+1I'
based upon the interest rate on deposits, adjusted and unadjusted for a risk premium,
and upon the lending rate. Results are not sensitive to the different measures  of 'N+  1
As we mentioned  before, the significance  of a3 and/or a4  represents deviations  from
the investment model under perfect capital markets. If  3C<0  and ax4=0, then the
model would be consistent with imperfections  related to agency/financial  distress costs
that make the borrowing rate depend upon the degree of leverage. If instead, a3>0 and
a4 < 0, then in addition  we expect to have binding credit constraints.
In Table 1 column (A) we present estimates  of the unrestricted  version of
(17) (the restriction -ct4=cl has not been imposed)  over the entire period. Column (A)
contains the results for the full sample of firms.' 4 The coefficients  al  and a2,  that are
functions  of the adjustment  cost parameter, b, and the elasticity of demand, s, have the
expected sign and are fairly significant. However, the estimates of a3 and a4,  that
capture capital market imperfections, suggest that we cannot reject the perfect capital
market model.  a3  and  a4,  in  fact,  are  not  individual or  jointly  significant (see
W2=4.86,  distributed as  X2(2)). The Sargan/Hansen test does not suggest gross
mispecification,  either.
It would be wrong, however, to conclude that the paradigm of a perfect
capital market is appropriate to describe the conditions  faced by all Ecuadorian  firms. It
is  likely,  for instance, that firms'  access to  external funding depends upon firms'
characteristics  like size and age. Informational  problems are likely to be more severe
for small and/or young firms. Size consideration may also affect the access to  the
directed credit programs at subsidized  rates available  in Ecuador, although  it is difficult
to say a priori which firms will benefit more. On the one hand, certain programs like
the ones promoting exports, are likely to be more advantageous  for large firms. The
13 When the ceiling on the degree of leverage is not binding, we can obtain from the first order
conditions  for debt, (12), a relationship  between  the firm's discount factor, on the one hand, and the safe
rate of interest and the debt to capital ratio, on the other. Assuming  that the safe rate of interest and the
tax parameters  for the next period are known at time t, we could solve for Pt  1 and use the result in the
Euler equation (17). However, when the ceiling  constraint is binding, we cannot replace  t  I in (20) in
terms of observable  variables  (A  m  will appear in the definition  of P1
14 The results in columns (A) through (C) are obtained using the interest rate on deposits to obtain a
proxy for P  1.16
latter probably also enjoyed better political  connections, which may be instrumental in
obtaining access to directed credit. On the other hand, in Ecuador there were lines of
credit that provided cheap access to long term finance for small firms.1 5 Finally, the
resources devoted to the provision of directed credit have actually decreased with the
introduction of  financial reform. We will discuss at  length the effect of  financial
liberalization  in the next section.
In column (B) of  Table  1,  we allow  the coefficients on  the  financial
variables, a3  and a4,  to differ between small and large companies. We define large
companies as  those that  have a  value of  capital stock (in  machinery, plant  and
equipment)  greater than 600,000 US dollars at 1975 prices. They represent in average
22% of the total sample over the period. Note that we allow firms to  transit over
different categories by introducing an endogenous size dummy variable for the two
categories and interacdng them with the last two financial terms in equation (19) . The
GMM estimation method we have adopted, that uses appropriate lagged variables as
instruments,  accounts  for the endogeneity  of the size dummies  and the other regressors.
In this case, the Wald test of joint significance  of the coefficients  on the leverage terms
(W2 =  10.25 with four degrees of freedom), points to a rejection of the model of
perfect capital markets at the 5% significance  level. A closer look at the results shows
an interesting difference between large firms, on the one hand, and smaller firms, on
the other. Note that the first number following  the a's  refers to the coefficient  number,
as defined in (20), and the second number refers to size (1 for large firms, 0 for small
firms). For large firms there is no strong indication that variables capturing firms'
financial  structure matter. It is interesting to note that despite its low significance, the
coefficient  on the quadratic term on the leverage ratio (a31) is negative, as one would
have expected in  the case where firms face increasing costs of  borrowing but no
binding credit constraints. The coefficient  on the linear term (X41) should then not be
different from zero.
15  See Jaramillo  (1992), Chapter  1I for more  detais on financial  reforms in Ecuador.17
Table I
Unrestricted Estimates of Equation (20):
Role of Size and Age
Coefficient  (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)
Whole sample  With size  With age  Including risk
interaction  interaction  premium
dunmies  dummies
alI  0.107  0.205  0.218  0.203
(_1-73  (2.81)  (2.40)  (2.84)
a2  0.030  0.038  0.039  0.038





a31  -0.038  0.012  -0.038
i___________ =00.  -(0.79)  (120)  -t0.80)
a30  _  _  _  0.022  0.022  0.022
(2.25)  (1.77)  (2.28)
a41  -0.835  0.183  -0.755
._____.______  -(0.38)  (0.41)  -(0.34)
a40  -0.884  -1.680  -0.864
-(1.25)  -(1.46)  -(1.25)
WI  17.83  24.97  20.84  25.09
4  6  6  6
W2  4.86  10.255  5.876  10.38
2  4  4  4
Ml  -8.29  -7.530  -8.660  -7.51
Sargan/Hansen  23.68  24.549  24.549  24.76
21  22  23  22
Instruments:  gmm(I/K),  gmm(I/K) 2,  gmm(Y/K),  L/K,  (L/K) 2,  D1(B/K),  D1(B/K) 2,  DO(B/K),
DO(B/K) 2,  1/(1  +i),  D1, all dated t-2 in levels. L represents  liquid assets; D1 is the dummy for large
(old) firms, DO for small (young) firms. Asymptotic 't'  statistics  are shown in parenthesis. WI: Wald
test for joint significance  of all the regressors.  W2: Wald test for joint significance  of financial  variables.
Ml:  test for first order serial correlation, distributed  as N(0,  1).  The Sargan/Hansen  test is distributed  as
a X2. Degrees  of freedom  are presented  below  the respective  tests.
For small firins, the situation is very different. Here we find a signiflcant
positive coefficient  on the quadratic term (a3O) which is consistent  with a  thodel  where
firms face both credit constraints  and rising costs of borrowing. The coefficient  on the
linear term (a40)  is  negative as expected in  this case, although not very precisely18
determined. This  suggest that  smaller firms  are  more  likely  to  be  affected by
informational  problems and not only have to pay an increasing  premium for debt, but
are also rationed in the credit markets.
A similar picture results if we divide firms by age. In column (C) of Table
1 we present results allowing for different slope coefficients  for young firms, and o!d
firms. Young firms are defined as those born after 1970, and represent 47% of the
sample.' 6 Young firms appear to be more constrained  and facing higher costs of debt,
as we can see from the coefficients  a30 and a40,  compared to old firms (see a3l  and
a41). Note also that letting financial  factors  have a different effect according to size or
age increases the overall significance,  as well as the individual significance  of the first
two coefficients  axl and a2 (on profits and output).  This is a further indication  that the
specification  allowing for capital market imperfections  is more satisfactory.
Up to this point we have allowed firms to differ only with respect to the
degree  and  type  of  capital  market  imperfections they  face.  However,  demand
elasticities and adjustment costs parameters may also differ across firms'  categories.
This can be easily handled by interacting, for instance the profit and output terms in
(20) with size dummies. When this is done, we cannot  reject the hypothesis  that cil and
cx2  do not differ across size categories. For the model in column (B), for example, the
Wald test is 2.32 with two degrees  of freedom.
Finally, in column (D) we report the results obtained when a risk premium
of 5 % for small firms is added to the deposit  rate in constructing  a proxy for 'St  1  As
one can see, results are nearly identical to the ones of column (A). The same is true if
the premium is added also for large firms.
Let us explore further the results obtained when size interaction dummies
are included. Since the coefficients  in front of the financial variables for large firms
(13l  and a4l)  are not significant,  we can set them both to zero. In this case we obtain
the model in column (A) of Table 2.
16 In this case, in aij, j refers to age a = I for old firms, and  j =0 for young firms).19
Table  2
RESTRICTED ESTIMATES  OF EQUATION  (20)
Coefricient  (A)  (B)
(X  0.211  0.165
(2.84)  (2.53)
o2  0.037  0.035
(3.55)  (4.05)
a31  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
o30  0.028  0.013
___________________  (2.62)  _  2.30)
a40  -1.046
-(1.50)  .
Wi  25.99  21.15
___=_X_-_  4  3
W2  10.66  6.29
2  1
Ml  -8.06  -8.19
420
Sargan/Hansen  26.66  22.29
20  22
See footnotes to Table I
The  corresponding  coefficients  for  smaller  firms  (a30  and  a40)  become
more  significant.  and  indicate  that  smaller  firms  suffer  from  both  sources  of  capital
market imperfections.  From equation (17) the coefficient in front of the profit term and
the one  in front  of  the  (linear)  leverage term  should  be equal  in  absolute value  and
opposite in sign (-a40  = azl). When we impose this restriction,  we obtain the model in
column  (B).  We  can  then  recover  the  structural  parameters  b,  e,  and  c.  All  the
coefficients  have  the expected sign and  are  significant.  Sargan/Hansen  test does  not
provide evidence against the specification and the choice of instruments. The structural
parameters of the model are presented in Table 3. All of them are significant and have
reasonable magnitudes.
The  size  of  the  elasticity  of  demand,  e,  indicates  that  firms  in  the
manufacturing  sector  have  some  monopolistic  power.  More  precisely,  an  e  of
approximately  4.5  implies a  mark-up over  marginal cost of 28.6%.  We are not aware
of any other study that estimates the elasticity of demand for manufacturers in Ecuador.
However,  the magnitude of this parameter is similar to the one obtained by estimating










.__________  _  :(6.70)
Asymptotic  't'  statistics  in parenthesis.
Investment  models estimated under the assumption of quadratic adjustment
costs have often yielded very high values of the adjustment  cost parameters that imply
huge costs of changing the capital stock. The value of b obtained here is,  instead,
reasonable  and it implies that adjustment  costs are approximately  6.2% of total sales in
manufacturing  during the 1984-1988  period, still substantial  but not unrealistically  so.
17
Finally, the slope  coefficient  of the marginal  agency cost for small finns, c,
implies that the average premium over the safe rate (calculated  at the average debt to
capital ratio) is 7.7%.'8  To get an idea of the importance  of the premium, note that in
1986, for example, the average nominal borrowing rate was 30.75% and the real one
approximate  9%.
17  =~~~~~~  b1 2 b  12 K
17  Note that adjustment  costs =  2K.  If we divide by Y, we get  2  j  y  This formula is used to
calculate  the size of adjustment  costs reported in the text, using sample  averages  for the investment  rate
(0.19), and the capital-output  ratio (0.37).
18  The premium  is equal to  c.  In the calculation  we have used the average leverage ratio for small
firms over the entire period (0.96).21
IV.- THE EFFECT  OF FINANCIAL  LIBERALIZATION
The importance  of capital market imperfections  for different types of firms
has been highlighted  and empirically  tested in last section. It is likely that the results we
have obtained reflect both the presence of asymmetric inforn,ation problems and the
importance  of administrative  controls on interest rates and on the allocation of credit
which were widely used until the first half of  the 80's.  In this section we discuss
whether financial liberalization  has relaxed financial  constraints for Ecuadorian firms.
This was the presumption of the  early literature on  financial liberalization, which
suggested that freeing the interest rates from controls that kept them artificially low,
would  increase the  supply of  loanable funds,  and  alleviate problems of  credit
constraints.1 9 Whatever the macro effect may be, it is not clear that liberalization  will
necessarily  relax financial  constraints for all classes of firms. Even after the elimination
of  administrative constraints, information problems remain and  it  is  possible that
certain firms may face a rise in the premium they have to pay  for external finance.
Moreover, one must pay attention to the impact for different classes of firms of the
reduced importance  of subsidized  credit programs that accompanies  financial  reform. In
the context of our model, one way to assess the impact of liberalization  is to analyze
whether there is a structural change in the coefficients  of the variable that capture the
rising cost of funds schedule, or the ceiling  on the degree of leverage.
Financial reform in Ecuador has not been implement  with a single act, but
has been a multi-stage  process. This implies that there is some degree of arbitrariness in
the choice of the breaking point of the sample to conduct tests of structural stability.
We have chosen 1986 because in that year interest rates on bank lending (with their
own funds) were freed and the real rate reached positive levels (of approximately 10
per cent in 1986 and 1987) for the first time in many years. Moreover, most subsidized
credit programs were eliminated  or substantially  reduced. These included  export credits
under FOPEX (Fund for Export Promotion) and subsidized  lines of credit for small
firms like FOPINAR  (Fund for Small Industry and Handicraft).
In  testing  for  structural change  in  the  context  of  equation  (17),  if
liberalization  relaxes the ceiling constraint, then the linear term in the leverage ratio
should not enter the equation (a4a=0).  20 Moreover, the coefficient on the quadratic
19  See McKinnon  (1973) and Shaw (1973) .
20  a refers to the value of the coefficients  after liberalization,  and b before liberalization.22
term  on  the  leverage ratio  (a3a)  should switch  sign  and  become  negative. If
liberalization  helps in mitigating  informational  problems that cause an increase in the
premium for external finance, then we would expect O3a to  be smaller in absolute
values than a3b,  its value before liberalization.  If both a3a and ax4a  are not significant
this  would  mean  that  the  perfect  market  paradigm  cannot  be  rejected  after
liberalization.
A different way of assessing  the impact  of financial  reform would be to see
whether the marginal significance  level of the Sargan/Hansen test of over-identifying
restrictions changes when the equation is estimated allowing the coefficients to differ
before and after liberalization.  The Sargan/Hansen  test statistics in Tables 2 and 4 do
not suggest that there evidence of  mispecification  against either set of equations, and
the marginal significance  levels do not change in any informative  way.
In the previous section we have argued that capital markets imperfections
affect mainly small firms. The relevant question is then whether financial  liberalization
has improved their access to external finance. Results are presented in column (A) of
Table 4  for the  model that corresponds to column (A) in Table 2,  but allows the
coefficients  on the financial  variables to differ pre and post liberalization.  The evidence
suggests that small firms suffered from a ceiling constraint and an increasing cost of
borrowing both  before and  after  liberalization.  Moreover we cannot  reject  the
hypothesis that the coefficients  capturing capital market imperfections  are identical in
the two sub periods.
Finally, if we impose the restriction that -a4Ob =  -a4Oa =  al,  as the
theory suggests, we can recover the structural  parameters. The results for the restricted
version of (17) are presented  in column (B). The estimates  in column (B) suggest that
the slope of the marginal agency costs function for small firms, c, decreases slightly
after  liberalization (from .175  to  .155),  and it  is  less significant. However, the
difference  is not statistically  significant.23
Table 4
EULER EQUATION  AND THE  EFFECT  OF FINANCIAL  REFORM
Coemcient  (A)  (B)
(Xl  0.190  0.164
(2.42)  (2.9
cx2  0.041  0.032
__________  _  _  _  (3.78)  (3.52)
O3Na  0.051  0.013
._________________  (2.41)  (1.51)
a3Ob  0.036  0.014




___________________  ~-(1.70)  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
WI  25.02  18.741
6  4
W2  12.87  6.547
4  2
Ml  -8.59  -9.035
Sargan/Hansen  15.98 1  21.995
l ________________  _ l17  19
See footnotes  to Table  1. In the  definition  of instruments  we  allow  for
the  pre and post  liberalization  split  for the  debt  to capital  ratio.
Although  we do not present the econometric  estimates  for reasons of space,
we have obtained very similar results when firms are divided according to their age.
Also in  this case,  the  financial constraints facing young firms were not affected
significantly  by financial  reform.
One of the drawbacks  of the Euler Equation approach is that it imposes a
tight structure on the data and is sensitive  to extraneous model mispecification.  For this
reason, it is useful to supplement  the results obtained from Euler equations with those
derived from estimating a more loosely specified investment  equation of a generalized
accelerator type, with the addition of variables that measure the availability  of internal
funds, like cash flow.  The idea is that, once we control for variables that capture
investment opportunities (the change and the lagged level of output in the equation
below) cash  flow should matter more if  a  firm is  financially constrained. 21 The
21 See Harris, Schiantarelli  and Siregar  (1992) for evidence  from unrestricted  investment  equations
estimated  on a panel  of Indonesian  firms  that financial  reform  has been  beneficial  for smaller  firms  in24
problem with this approach is that cash flow itself may be an indicator of  future
profitability.
The equation  we have estimated  is:
(20)  Kt  °  Kt-  I  Kt  Kt  l  pk KF  I
where:  CFt_1- is the lagged cash flow to capital ratio
Ptk1  Kt-l
The model was estimated  in first differences  and using GMM, to control for
firm specific  effects and to account for endogeneity  problems. We have also interacted
cash flow with two dummy variables which equal one respectively  for large firms and
for the post liberalization  period, and are zero otherwise. The coefficients on these
three additional regressors capture the  difference due  to  size being  large and  to
liberalization,  with respect to the reference case of small firms in the pre liberalization
period. 22 The results, reported in Table 5, suggest that cash flow has a different effect
on  large  and  small firms.  While the  availability of  internal finance is  of  some
importance for the latter (shown by a positive and significant  y4 coefficient equal to
0.082),  it is not for large firms (the sum of y4 and y4l  is practically zero). This
situation did not change for either small or  large firms after financial liberalization,
since we cannot reject the hypothesis  that a4a and a4la  are individually  or jointly zero.
The conclusions  that can be derived from the estimation  of the unrestricted investment
equation are similar to those obtained from the  Euler equation approach.  Results
presented here suggest that financial reform did not help in improving the access to
credit markets or in reducing significantly  the premium for external finance for small
firms.
Indonesia.
22 In the coefficients  definition, I denotes  large firms,  and a the period after liberalization.25
Table 5
AD HOC INVESTMENT EQUATION AND
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Instruments:  gmm(I/K),  gmrn(Y/K),  gmm(CF/K),  gimnmnB/K),  it/K, GDP by industry, 1  +i,  all dated t-2.
WI: Wald  test for  joint significance  of all the regressors.  W2: Wald test for  joint significance  of financial
variables.  Ml: first order serial correlation  test; M2: second  order serial correlation  test, both distributed
as N(0,1).
V.- CONCLUSIONS
The estimation of Euler equations  for the capital stock suggests that capital
market imperfections have  a  differential effect  across firms,  both  pre  and  post
liberalization. In particular there is empirical support for a  rising supply of funds
schedule  and rationing in the case of small (young) firms, but not in the case of large
(old) firms.  Our econometric  results are not supportive  of a substantial  regime change
after liberalization.  Financial  reform in Ecuador does not seem to have had much effect
on the financial constraints faced by small firms when making investment  decisions.
The continuing  presence of informational  imperfections,  and the decrease in resources26
devoted to promoting cheap access to credit for small firms after liberalization  are part
of  the explanation. One should treat this conclusion with caution, since the  Euler
equation approach imposes a  rather stringent structure on  the data.  However, the
econometric  results do not contain obvious signs of mispecification,  and the estimation
of a more loosely  specified  investment  model  leads to the same  conclusions.
The main limitation of our exercise is the fact that we have available a
small number of years before and after the implementation  of financial  reform to allow
us to  asses fully its  effects in  the  longer term.  Moreover, the  evolution of  the
macroeconomic  situation in Ecuador may help in explaining our results. In fact, the
increase in the real interest rate in Ecuador was interrupted by a severe inflationary
episode in 1988, following  a major earthquake  and fiscal mismanagement.  Finally, the
second part of the 80's saw a reduction in the funds provided by the Central Bank to
the  commercial banks  (to  support directed credit  programs) that  was  not  fully
compensated  by the increase in financial savings during the years of positive interest
rate. As a result, the real supply of credit to the private sector decreased in real terms
between 1986 and 1988, and it is likely that this has influenced  the effect of financial
reform on different categories  of firms. All this suggest that further work is needed on
different countries and using longer panels. This paper should only be considered  as a
first step in evaluating  the impact  of financial  reform on financial  constraints.27
DATA APPENDIX
The econometric  estimation was based on a balanced panel of 420 firms in
the manufacturing  sector for which there was continuos information for sales, capital
stock, value added, profits, and other key variables  for the study. Firms selected  had to
satisfy standard consistency checks, and  additional criteria, including non-negative
capital stock or  value added. The panel is based on  information collected by  the
"Superintendecia de  Companias" (SC) of  Ecuador. SC  is  an  official agency that
controls corporate activities. Among other  duties, every  quarter  SC  collects and
inspects information presented by companies. By law, firms have to submit accurate
information  in order to do business  in Ecuador and carry out a wide range of activities
such as obtaining credit (official loans, as well as regular credit), tax identification
numbers, etc.
The data includes yearly balance  sheet and profit and losses information  for
the period 1984-1988.  The balance sheets  also include information  of the revaluation  of
assets allowed by  the  Government to  account  for  inflation  and  exchange rate
depreciation.  The definition  of investment  includes  plant and machinery,  buildings,  and
others (excluding land), and has been obtained by taking the difference between the
gross capital stock at historical  cost. The capital stock measure used in the equations  is
instead the revalued measures of the net capital stock. Our measure of debt includes
both long term and short term debt, mainly obtained from banks and other financial
institutions. Trade debt is not included. As a proxy for the output price we have used
the two-digit wholesale  price index. As a proxy for the price of investment  goods, we
have used the aggregate  investment  deflator. Both series are regularly published  by the
Banco Central del Ecuador. The statutory tax rates and depreciation allowances  were
used in calculating rt and the present value of tax savings associated  with a unit of new
investment, pt.  The personal tax rate, mt  has been set equal to 20% and the effective
rate on capital gains, zt, equal to zero.
In estimating  our model  we classify  as large those firms with a capital stock
larger than 600.000 dollars at 1975  prices. The panel includes 91 large and 329 small
firms. We define as young those firms that are born after  1970. The panel has 197
young firms and 223 old firms.  For additional  details on the data sources see Jaramillo
(1992).28
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